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Prof. C. F. Dunbar

27 Nov. 1891

WHAT IS POLITICAL SCIENCE?

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WHAT IS POLITICAL SCIENCE?

An Inaugural Lecture

GIVEN IN THE CONVOCATION HALL

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO,

9TH NOVEMBER, 1888.

BY

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WHAT IS POLITICAL SCIENCE?

The addition of a new group of studies to the work of a University must always be a measure of questionable expediency. It disturbs, if only for a time, that quiet continuance in well-doing to which a University must owe its strength; it opens the door to endless proposals of innovation; it entails an increased expenditure; and it brings with it the evil of new machinery; above all, of additional examinations. And yet one of the most evident facts in University history, during the last thirty years, is the tendency in this direction.

The most signal examples are those furnished by Philology and by the Physical and Biological Sciences. These have gradually forced their way into a position of equality with the older studies: their victory has been scarcely less complete in the old Universities of Europe with their conservative traditions, than in the New Country where Universities spring up like mushrooms. Now that the controversy is at an end, we can recognise that the change has been the result not of mere love of novelty, but of urgent need. It was because men came within sight of new truth, and of new means of discovering truth, in a way which opened up for them whole continents of possible know-

ledge. Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Classical Scholarship did not become in themselves less valuable; but other subjects were seen to be valuable of whose existence men had before scarcely dreamed. The *Orbis Veteribus Notus* was not smaller; but it was no longer the whole world.

"Political Science" is the last new claimant for admission. Already two of the foremost Universities in America, Columbia and Cornell, have created separate courses of instruction under that name, and have each appointed a due staff of teachers. Others, such as Johns Hopkins, Michigan, and Harvard, though they have not adopted the plan of creating a separate department for certain subjects, have given those subjects far greater prominence than before. In France again, one of the most hopeful signs of the times is the success of M. Boutmy's creation, the Free School of Political Science at Paris. Already it has done good work in the preparation of men for the Civil Service; and in the writings of its director and of M. Sorel, one of its professors, it has produced some of the very best books on modern politics. But it is from Germany that the impulse has come. In its Universities, political studies—historical, economic, administrative, and legal,—have long been pursued with an energy unknown elsewhere. That a separate department has not been created anywhere, except I believe at Tübingen, is due to the elastic character of German University organization, which

for many years we cannot hope to imitate here. But certainly the attention given to these subjects, especially to economics, is increasing rather than diminishing in Germany. Even in England there is a movement in the same direction. The Modern History School at Oxford, the History Tripos at Cambridge, both do something towards fitting men to form an intelligent judgment on the political and economic questions of their own time. I can only speak from personal knowledge of Oxford; but certainly the History School there, though it has to struggle against the prestige of the Classical School, and against a tutorial system which almost stifles research, is growing in importance every year.

There is, then, a pretty general tendency towards the introduction into Universities of certain studies. And a general tendency is probably due to a common cause affecting all the countries where the tendency shews itself. Before, however, we seek for this common cause, there is a preliminary question to be answered—"What, indeed, is Political Science?"

In the first place, I do not think that Universities are likely to understand by Political Science what is called "Sociology." The conception of a science of sociology, which shall arrive at and teach a general theory of "social development, structure, and function," to use the language of Mr. Herbert Spencer, has been of great value. But its value has lain

not in the positive results of professed sociologists, but in the influence of such a conception upon students of history and political economy. It has raised before them the hope that they may be able to make out some sort of rational development in the life of humanity: it has aroused them to a perception of the relatively minor importance of what may be called the dynastic, and picturesque, and anecdotic sides of history: and it has reminded them that all the manifestations of human activity are indissolubly connected with one another. If our history books are no longer "drum and trumpet chronicles," if our economists are no longer content to give exclusive attention to the workings of individual self-interest in the pursuit of wealth, it is due largely to the prophets of sociology. But while we agree with them in thinking that we must try to get our heads above the turmoil of isolated facts, and arrive at generalizations as to the meaning of facts, we cannot but feel the dangers of a too soaring ambition. For the present, and probably for many years to come, it will be wise to limit our view to smaller and more manageable groups of phenomena than the whole experience of the race. We shall be content, for instance, if only we can arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to the stages by which what we understand as the *family* came into being; or the idea of *property* took the shape it has now; or, to take an example of a somewhat different order, if we could ascertain whether English history begins with a population of serfs or of

freemen; or if we could get a true and not a rose-coloured view of the conditions of industry which preceded the advent of the factory, and of the changes which that advent produced. When these problems shall have been solved, and a score of others like them, it will then be time enough to seek to formulate laws applicable to the whole history of mankind. Certainly the results at which distinguished sociologists have arrived are not so encouraging that we can venture on making them the basis of our teaching. That "a differentiation of the originally homogeneous mass of units into a co-ordinating part and a co-ordinated part is the indispensable initial step in the growth of a society," which is Mr. Spencer's chosen example to "convey a clear idea of the nature of sociological truth," does not seem to be anything more than the statement in unnecessarily technical terms, that all societies have some sort of government. It does not in the least help us to understand how that government arose, or what has been its nature.

Political Science is something more modest. It is systematic knowledge concerning the state or political society,—concerning its constitution, its functions, the organs by which these functions are discharged, its relation to the individual and to other societies.

It falls into several well defined branches. Take first, Constitutional History and Law. Here we are called upon to examine the manner in which the

public authority is constituted, and the legal limits of its power. If a country has a written constitution, it will be our duty to study its provisions; to learn what those responsible for them intended the provisions to mean; to ascertain what interpretation has, as a matter of fact, been put upon them; how far and in what way they have been enforced; and to discover what changes in the essential character of the government may have taken place beneath an unchanging theory or an unchanging machinery. If the constitution is unwritten, we have to disentangle the principles which characterise it, and to ascertain the sanctions, if any, upon which they rest. The State whose constitution must engage the largest share of our attention, the Dominion of Canada, will present the further problem created by Confederation,—the relative limits of central and provincial authority, as determined by legislative enactment, by legal decision, and by usage.

The method of study which we shall probably find most profitable will be largely *historical* and *comparative*. We must of course begin by mastering the various enactments and precedents which would guide a court of law in deciding questions submitted to it. But our object is not merely that of the lawyer or politician. The lawyer wishes to know how certain words are likely to be interpreted by the courts. The politician wishes to know how certain measures, which he proposes to advocate or attack,

stand, or may be made to appear to stand, in relation to the letter of the constitution. Our object is to ascertain what the real character of the constitution is; and to this end contrast is the most valuable of means. We must compare the constitution in its present stage with its earlier stages, the constitution of one country with that of another. This is the more imperative if we are to end with pronouncing, as I think we must attempt to pronounce, a judgment of some kind on the constitution we have been examining:—"it has such and such merits, such and such defects: how are these defects to be remedied?" The wisdom of statesmen may succeed in devising new safeguards and better institutions: but meantime some light is to be gained by enquiring whether the same evils have appeared in other countries; if so, whether any attempt has been made to meet them, and with what success; and if they have not appeared, what reason can be assigned for their absence.

We shall find, I doubt not, that the underlying causes of constitutional differences are social rather than strictly political,—that they depend on the relation between the wealth of a country and its inhabitants, on the nature of that wealth, on the manner in which it is produced, and the way in which it is divided. We shall find, moreover, that most of the movements and forces which cause constitutional questions to be raised and lead to constitutional changes, still more the political contests waged within

the lines of constitutions, are at bottom economic in their character. For instance, the real cause of the Reform Bill of 1832 in England was no mere theory as to the justice of giving every man a share in his own government, but the growth of a great and powerful manufacturing class.

By a necessary and easy transition, therefore, we pass from the sphere of Constitutional History and Constitutional Law to that of Political Economy. Political Economy is the subject to which, both by preference and in accordance with the requirements of the new department, my own attention will be mainly directed; and I shall not scruple to rely upon your patience while I explain the point of view from which I regard it.

Ten or fifteen years ago Political Economy occupied, in English-speaking countries, no very dignified or useful position. In England it was represented by two very able men, Cairnes and Jevons. Neither of these, however, had any considerable influence upon the educated public; and the professorial teaching at Oxford and Cambridge was of but small scientific importance. In University and College instruction, Political Economy was the convenient stopgap. It was thought to be especially good for Passmen, and Passmen certainly found it the easiest subject on which to "get through." A large number of the women who availed themselves of the new opportunities for higher

education, turned their attention to it ; and there were not wanting scoffers who said that the reason was because Political Economy was easier than Classics or Mathematics. It had also this practical recommendation,—that any clever man could be put to teach it at a day's notice. But few clever men really believed in it as a useful possession in after-life. Nobody was inclined to deny that it was all true—"so far as it went,"—but there was a sort of feeling that it didn't go very far ; and that considerations which the economist declared he must disregard in order to arrive at scientific precision, rendered the "pure theory" of little avail.

Meanwhile the very term Political Economy stank in the nostrils of intelligent working men. Mechanics' Institutes had been fed upon it for half a century to show artisans how that everything in the industrial world was for the best; or, at any rate, that it could not be improved by combination, or by the interference of the State. It was true that Free Trade, with its cheap loaf, was a victory for the political economists, as well as for the manufacturing over the agricultural interest: but Free Trade was by this time a matter of ancient history, while the opposition of economists to Trade Unions was a matter of every day history. Unfortunately it was not the economists of authority who had the public ear ; they, by this time, had abandoned in large measure their old attitude ; and even Miss Martineau lived to repent having written her

stories in Political Economy; but the newspapers still repeated the language of an earlier period and were always ready in any trade dispute to tell workingmen that the "laws" of Political Economy were against them.

With statesmen, too, Political Economy was in an almost equally bad case. Conservatives remembered that they had carried the Factory Acts in the teeth of the manufacturers' appeals to Political Economy. Liberals found the same dread authority put in their path, when they proposed to regulate the conditions of contract between Irish landlords and tenants. The consequence was, that each side became callous; and after "wolf" had been cried so often, were inclined to conjecture there was no wolf in existence. Political Economy was still treated with distant respect: politicians expressed the regret with which they found themselves obliged, by unfortunate necessity, and under altogether exceptional circumstances, to "violate its laws." But the bold phrase of Mr. Gladstone, "that the principles of Political Economy must be relegated to the planet Saturn," showed the direction in which opinion was tending. From custom and politeness a section was still assigned to Economics at the meetings of the British Association; but biologists and mathematicians shrugged their shoulders over the scientific pretentions of their economic companions, and it was even suggested that the Association would gain in dignity by doing without their assistance.

In the United States, until the civil war, Political Economy was apparently taught only because it was taught in England, and, as in England, was found an easy way of giving students something to do. It had not even the interest of being a cure for the discontent of workmen, because as yet there was scarcely any discontent to cure: and men of the world were not likely to take a high view of the value of a science whose professors were free traders or protectionists according to the state in which they taught.

Meanwhile a revolution was being accomplished in Germany. There the doctrines of Adam Smith and his successors had never gained the same complete dominance as in England. The chief duty of professors of Political Science was the preparation of candidates for the civil service; and consequently they were led to look at matters with the eyes of administrators, and not, as economists in England, through the spectacles of the merchant or manufacturer. The Government of Prussia, with all its faults, deserves the reputation of having fostered the national interests of the country, and of having defended the weak against the strong. The abolition of the feudal fetters on land, to take the most notable example, had been the work, not of revolution or of popular agitation, but of the Government guided by Stein and Hardenberg. Hence the German economists had by no means the prejudice against Government action which was natural to an English or

French Liberal. And they could not fail to be influenced by what has been the great achievement of German thought in the last fifty years,—the discovery and application of the Historical Method. The Historical Method had already transformed the study of law when it passed to Political Economy. It began to be seen that economic principles could not claim to be true at all times and places, and that their truth was relative to certain conditions which may be absent or change. The tendency to discontent with the old Political Economy was strengthened with the growth of Socialism,—when it was found that the orthodox doctrine showed no way out of the difficulties which the social changes of the century had brought; and still more that the orthodox doctrine itself could be claimed, with much shew of truth, as the foundation of their most dangerous enemy, the scientific Socialism of Marx and Lassalle. The result was evident when, at the Congress of Eisenach in 1872, it became apparent, to the consternation of parliamentary Liberals and newspapers, that the great majority of professors in German Universities taught a Political Economy which was not that of the reputed founders of the science.

Before long a similar movement began to shew itself in England. Carlyle and Ruskin had for years assailed the current Political Economy and all its works. Their criticism was in the main true and salutary; yet it was only too easy to show that they

misunderstood what the economist intended his science to be. But about ten years ago the strange sight was to be witnessed of an onslaught on economic orthodoxy, not by muddle-headed philanthropists or unscientific men of letters, but by men with a competent knowledge of economic literature; men, moreover, in positions of authority as teachers of economics,—by Cliffe Leslie, a professor at Dublin, by Mr. Ingram, from the President's chair in the Economic Section of the British Association, and a little later by Arnold Toynbee, an Oxford tutor.

In England, as in Germany, one of the main causes had been, the growth of historical studies: another was the success which had attended those measures of legislation which ran counter to the maxim of *laissez faire.* A further cause was the influence of Comte. But clearly it was the example of German economists which gave the signal for revolt.

It is important to notice the scientific character of this new movement. Up to that time the only Political Economy thought possible was the Political Economy of the old English school. If their doctrines were untrue, then Political Economy was untrue and ought to disappear. But now the argument was, not that all Political Economy was valueless, but that a particular Political Economy, a particular set of doctrines was at fault.

It is difficult to describe in general terms the position of the younger economists. They differ from one another in the emphasis they lay on this or that idea, and some of them go to extremes in reaction But the general conclusions to which they come may perhaps be fairly stated thus: a Political Economy is possible which shall be of real value to society; in it the old doctrines will be shewn to be not untrue, but to have only a relative truth, and to deserve a much less important place than has been assigned to them; and the direction for fruitful work is no longer in the pursuit of the abstract deductive method which has done as much service as it is capable of, but in following new methods of investigation—historical, statistical, inductive.

In all the countries of Europe, and now lastly in America, the stagnant waters have been stirred. In France the establishment, in 1878, of professorships of economics in the provincial law faculties has had the effect to the surprise of everyone, of bringing into existence a body of teachers most of whom are in opposition to the tradition of Say and the Journal des Economistes; and a couple of years ago a number of heterodox "young men from Germany" successfully organized the American Economic Association.

You will be inclined to ask, I imagine, why I have not reserved this historical narrative for my future pupils. I have thought it well to dwell upon it in this place, because I wish to make it clear that while

economic studies are now being pursued in other countries with a seriousness and ardour altogether new, a great number of its teachers occupy a scientific position different in many important respects from that of the older economists; and that this divergence is not the result of individual caprice, but of a movement of thought common to all civilized countries.

It will have been evident that I regard these recent tendencies with sympathy. But there has been so much vague talk about "inductive" and "deductive," the phrase "the new political economy" has been used to cover so much sentimentalism, that I must crave your attention while I make my own position somewhat clearer. In the first place, I altogether repudiate the idea which most people associate with the term "the new political economy." The old political economy was a neat little body of compendious "laws" and maxims; and it is naturally supposed that now an opposition set of dogmas is being brought forward. But it was just this confidence in neat dogmas that was the main fault of the average economist of the old school. Nor can I agree with those who would try to disregard the orthodox teaching altogether. Much of it was founded on observation and history. The evil consequences of indiscriminate poor relief, for instance, were demonstrated by the history of England during the first thirty years of this century; they can be explained by some very obvious facts of human nature; and men

need to be frequently reminded of them,—even though we may think that poor law reformers usually took too narrow a view of the social maladies they sought to cure. Indeed I should go very much further, and even accept most of the so-called "laws" of rent, wages, profits, and price, as hypothetically true,—that is, true under certain conditions, of which the existence of complete competition is the most important. Herein I am the docile pupil of Mill and Cairnes; I differ from them only in laying greater stress on the conditions. The tendencies which they express do exist in society, with important consequences; and when the economist looks out upon the industrial world to study any specific question, the knowledge of what well-informed and undiluted and unimpeded self-interest would produce will help to interpret the facts before him. But having mastered this modicum of abstract theory,—no difficult task,—the important thing, it seems to me, is to directly tackle the pressing economic questions of the present. The method of investigation, in my opinion, most fruitful I would call the *historical*, did I not know that the term invites misapprehension. It is asked what light is thrown upon the difficulties of to-day by merely antiquarian research into the gilds of the 14th century. Much more, perhaps, than the critic supposes. But the method I mean is the method of direct observation and generalisation from facts, whether past or present; a method you can call "inductive" if you wish to be polite, or "empirical" if

you wish to indicate scorn. Let me make my meaning clearer by an example. When a historian, like Dr. Stubbs, wants to find out the character of the administrative system established by Henry II. he goes to the laws and chronicles of the period, selects the more important facts by the rules of evidence, and then generalises from them. It seems to me that the economist could examine, for instance, the position of the agricultural interest in Ontario by just the same sort of method. The evidence will be more copious, and he may have more difficulty in distinguishing trustworthy from untrustworthy statements, but his frame of mind and his procedure may be substantially the same as in the case of the historian. And the results will be of the same sort. The historian does not end with a "law of administration," but he sketches the main outlines of the financial or judicial organisation. So the economist will not aim at ending with a "law of rent" or a "law of production" based on Ontarian facts, but with a picture of Ontarian agriculture, and of the influences that affect it.

Having got to certain conclusions on a particular economic question, it seems to me, it is then the duty of the economist to point out the evils or dangers, if any, that may be present, and to suggest means for their removal. Some English economists indeed declare that their subject is a science, not an art,—that they must strictly limit themselves to the explanation of what *is*, and give no hint as to what *should be*. But

there has never yet been an economist who has not sometimes given advice in spite of himself: certainly the great public looks to the economist for practical guidance; and it is better to accept the situation. Surely he who has given more careful consideration than others to the economic side of social life, ought to be more capable of giving sound advice about it. Criticism, however, presupposes a standard; we cannot praise or blame this or that action, this or that group of facts, except with reference to some test. And two such standards present themselves, the moral standard, and what, by the abuse of the term "economic," has been called the "purely economic" standard. The moral standard is that furnished by the simple precept to do unto others as we would that they should do unto us. It is still applicable to a wide range of conduct,—how wide it should be the duty of theological professors to ascertain, and of the pulpit to teach. But there are difficulties attending its use for our purpose. In the first place, it is becoming impossible, in an increasingly large number of cases, to apply the standard of what would be just as between individuals; cases, in which, if the term "justice" is to be used at all, it must itself be interpreted by something beyond the mere individual. And, in the second place, even when we can decide without hesitation that a particular condition of things is morally wrong, our conclusion is not likely to carry the weight we should wish for it with those we most desire to influence,—those, namely, who exercise

the legislative and administrative authority of the state. They have come to be possessed with an exaggerated belief in the private nature of morality; a belief that the state has nothing to do with morality as such, so long as there is no obvious breach of public order, no violent seizure of property, or injury to person. To say that a thing is morally wrong is only to provoke the reply that it must be left to conscience and the clergy. Can we then fall back on the economic standard, the amount of wealth produced? I think not It will be found, I believe, that many of the gravest evils of the present time have arisen from the almost exclusive use, during the past half century, of this criterion,—from the satisfaction people have felt in the belief that a certain course of action led to an increase in the production of "wealth," without stopping to consider the intrinsic character of the wealth, or the way in which when produced it was distributed.

The title of the Department which has just been created, and of the Chair which has been entrusted to me, suggests another, and, I would hope, a more useful and trustworthy standard. It is the Department of *Political* Science, and the Chair of *Political* Economy. All the studies of this course are concerned ultimately with society in its organised form as the State; and in all of them, accordingly, the final test in any matter must be the welfare of the State. The association of Economics with the other subjects of the course will be of the greatest advantage by forcing us to look at

phenomena in their relation to the whole of society, and not merely in their relation to the individual. This change in the point of view of economists has already in large measure taken place; and it is illustrated by the fact that whenever nowadays a University cannot afford to have a whole Professor for Political Economy, the subject is almost always associated with History, while until recently it was usually an appendage to the Chair of Moral Philosophy. What is, or will be, for the welfare of the State, is not always, it must be allowed, easy to make out. But again and again it is clear enough, when once we are sure of our facts. It may sometimes be demonstrated, to take an extreme case, that if certain forces operate unchecked, they will inevitably produce classes dangerous to the very existence of the State. Conclusions much less startling than these, conclusions merely that the State will be harmfully affected if individuals continue to act in a particular way, will give the economist an evident claim on the attention of statesmen, and this is an advantage which no other sort of appeal would secure.

Their attention is desirable. For I believe that the same thought that supplies a standard of judgment suggests the direction to which we may often look for aid in removing the ills we discover. It is coming to be recognized, by practical measures, if not yet in principle, that the state has a positive duty as well as a negative, and that it cannot limit its action to the pro-

tection of life and property. Most of the younger economists feel that since the very exercise of individual rights rests on the existence of society, of which the state is the organised expression, the state can justly claim, in the interest of the common good, to modify individual rights. Of course their eyes are open to the great risks which attend what is called "state interference": they are not likely to forget the danger of increasing the official class with such an object lesson as the United States before them. Accordingly they do not go to the extreme of preaching state action in all departments as the remedy for all our ills. But, on the other hand, they no longer accept *laissez faire* as a general principle. Each case, they think, must be decided on its merits, on a balance of advantages and disadvantages. The state may wisely do some things and not others; and it may do things in some countries which in others it ought to be prevented from attempting.

I have left myself but little time to speak of the other branches of Political Science,—of Political Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Municipal Law, International Law, and History. Of these, Political Philosophy and Jurisprudence are both very closely allied to Economics. At every turn in the work of social or political reform we are confronted with the questions of the purpose of the state, of the limits of individual liberty, and of the opposing claims of order and progress. No plan seems more likely to help us to clear

ideas on the subject than that of following the history of political theory from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel and Herbert Spencer, and examining the relation of the theories of each to the conditions of government at the time. The historical method of dealing with political theory is the more likely to be of use, since it is coming to be seen that the State itself is subject to development; and that all we can say is, that the State at such and such a period may wisely undertake certain duties, not that the State *as such* has necessarily certain functions. Jurisprudence presents a striking analogy. The analytical jurisprudence of Austin sought to define what constituted a law; the historical school of Maine seeks rather to trace how the modern conception of a law arose, and how the great legal ideas of property, inheritance, crime, and the like, obtained their present shape.

Of the more strictly legal studies which are to form part of the Political Science Curriculum in this place, —the English and Roman law,—I am not competent to speak. Here I find myself in the company of jurisconsults whose learning puts a layman to shame. I comfort myself by remembering the counsel of an eminent constitutional lawyer in England, to whom I mentioned that it did not seem quite decided whether I was to belong to Law or Arts. He advised me to place myself on the side of the lawyers, on the ground that the lawyers are more in touch with practical life. I recognize, of course, the great value of a know-

ledge of the rudiments of English law to the future politician, journalist, or administrator. As an economist I feel that far too little attention has been given to the economic consequences of the legal framework of society, the legal barriers within which individual interest is left free to work. But I am disposed to be on my guard lest my legal colleagues should yield too easily to a generous enthusiasm for the extension of the knowledge of the law.

Let us now go back to the question with which we set out. Why has Political Science already found a place for itself among the studies of other Universities, and why is it wise to give it a place at Toronto? It is significant that in Economics, the subject which, in my opinion, forms the most important part of Political Science, the beginnings of University teaching were closely connected with great political and industrial movements. In Germany and Italy they were associated with the creation of paternal bureaucracies; and the professorships of "Chamber Sciences" established by Frederick William I. about 1727, and in Naples and Milan some forty years later, were primarily intended to train administrative officials. In England the establishment of chairs of Political Economy was the offspring of the industrial revolution which rendered obsolete the old conditions both of manufacture and trade. In like manner the present action of Universities is due to the perception of a grave political situation. Every civilized country is rapidly

being democratised in fact as well as in theory; by which I mean that everywhere political power is falling to the numerical majority of the male inhabitants, and that "the masses" are everywhere becoming less disposed to vote at the bidding of their social superiors. But the numerical majority of the people are ignorant, and if things are allowed to go on as they are going on, will inevitably fall a prey to the arts of unscrupulous party politicians. With the United States before us he would indeed be an optimist who could believe that when churches are once disestablished, and aristocracies destroyed, and every man has a vote, the work of the political reformer is at an end. The numerical majority, again, are poor. It is equally inevitable, therefore, that attempts should be made to use their political power to secure a different distribution of wealth. I will not here consider how far the social difficulties from which we now suffer are the outcome of the industrial freedom and the mechanical improvements of our own time, nor how far the attempts to secure better conditions by combination or by the action of the state may or may not be justifiable. Anyhow, it is evident that economic questions are more and more forcing themselves to the front, and whatever one's sympathies may be, it is certain that many unwise measures will be proposed.

With a Democratic Government, politics can only be saved from corruption by a large number of citizens taking an active part in politics who have given

a serious and honest attention to the questions at issue, and are determined to make their weight felt. To meet the industrial difficulties, again, which press upon us for solution, an impartial study of the situation, with all the aid Economic Science can give us, is our only hope. In the Old World where a revolutionary socialism is a menacing danger, I should urge this with more vehemence than you might think suitable in this place ; for on a continent whose surface has as yet only been lightly scratched, it may seem absurd to talk of threatening social convulsions. Still I would remind you that here in this Province you have strikes and pauperism, just as in Europe: that on this continent single individuals, or small groups of individuals, have gained control of industrial and mercantile operations vastly larger than in Europe ; and that, on the other hand, associations of working men bigger than any over there have come into existence. All these things may present no immediate danger ; I know too little of the New World to have an opinion ; but at any rate they deserve careful attention.

Even, however, if we put vital questions such as the relation between labour and capital on one side, it is obvious that with the growth of great industrial states, economic issues must play an increasingly large part in politics. Examples will at once occur to you in the currency, and in railroad management. If I allude to tariffs I am aware I get on dangerous ground. Yet I suppose both parties would agree that to arrive

at an impartial and even a true conclusion as to the advisability of a certain policy, is not beyond the bounds of human ability. And they would further agree that to examine in detail the tariff history of a country, and the facts presented by the several industries, is more likely to lead to a wise conclusion as to what should be done, than if we confine ourselves to the current generalities as to selfishness or patriotism.

The introduction of the studies of Philology and Natural Science into University life we have seen to have been due to a widening conception of the sphere of knowledge. I think it may be said that the introduction of Political Science is due to a widening conception of personal duty. The work of governing a great modern state is not an easy one; it is not one which average common sense and party management can be left alone to control. I will not here lay stress on the advantages of such a course to the man who intends to "enter politics," to the man who looks forward to journalism, to the future civil servants of the country. These lie on the surface, and I am sure they will prove sufficiently attractive to men of ambition. I leave it to my legal colleagues to dwell on its value as an introduction to the profession of a lawyer. And I shall hope to find another occasion for urging upon the clergy what appears to me the close connection of Economics with Ethics. To-day I prefer to take a broader ground, to remind you of the perils of an ignorant democracy, and to plead for *the education of the citizen.*

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